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Abstract
In recent years, scientists have noted a decline in the health of bee populations. Whereas a whole
host of possible causes have been identified, it is the use of pesticides in agriculture—specifically
the use of neonicotinoids—that has warranted some investigation. The scientific evidence of their
impact on the health of bees remains debated. This article examines how the UK Government has
responded to the decline in bee populations and the apparent link to neonicotinoids. While notional-
ly committed to deploying the Precautionary Principle in such instances, the government has tended
to err more on ‘sound science’ as a policymaking tool. Early evidence indicates that the government
used the latter initially but has become more amenable to utilising a precautionary approach recent-
ly. Whether this can be attributed to an embrace of the Precautionary Principle, or simply a change
caused by the installation of a new Secretary of State for the Environment, is open to interpretation.
Key words: bee health, precautionary principle, government regulation
Introduction
Governments rely on scientific advisors in much of their policy-
making and having the authority and status of scientists to approve
policy decisions provides governments with an important kind of
support. However, governments tend to expect scientists to always
provide positive evidence on what are often difficult issues, and this
is because there are often uncertainties in the evidence, as the exam-
ples from medical science discussed below will illustrate. In cases
where there is uncertainty, there are two alternative ways of pro-
ceeding: either to wait until the evidence becomes conclusive that a
problem does exist which requires governmental intervention (the
sound science approach); or to take immediate action in advance of
conclusive evidence that there is a problem which requires govern-
mental intervention, because, if action is delayed until that evidence
becomes available, it might be too late to prevent irreversible harm
being done (that is, a precautionary approach, or one based on the
precautionary principle). There are many examples, as we will see,
that suggest ‘that while nominally committed to the precautionary
principle, the UK government tends to take a more “sound science”
approach to regulating environmental risk’ (Patterson and McLean
2017: 2). Somewhat unexpectedly, however, in the case of neonico-
tinoids and bee health the government’s position has evolved into a
more precautionary stance than might otherwise have been
expected, based on previous action.
Although the issue of pesticides and bee health had been period-
ically debated for some time, the use of neonicotinoids and their po-
tential impact on bee populations became news in March 2011. This
was due to a report in the Beekeeper newssheet BeeMail on March
2011, noting that a former Home Office Minister, David Hanson,
had put a parliamentary question to Spelman about the issue
(BeeMail 2011). In addition, an Ecologist petition titled ‘Save the
Bees’ that was handed to the then Secretary of State for the
Environment, Caroline Spelman (Lee 2011). By December 2012, the
Environmental Audit Committee held a session on ‘Insects and
Insecticides’ (but not specifically on neonicotinoids). In this session,
a group of scientists presented evidence about their paper on the
issue, stating they had sent their paper to Spelman and the Chief
Scientist who had confirmed they had read it, but who replied that
the scientists ‘did not have enough proof’ of a link between insecti-
cides/neonics and bee health (House of Commons 2012). By this
time, a new Secretary of State for the Environment, Owen Paterson,
had been appointed, and since that time the issue has not abated.
A useful way of tracking the UK’s stance on neonicotinoids is to fol-
low the actions/speeches of the Secretaries of States for the
Environment during the period 2010 to 2018, given that the issue of
neonicotinoids and bee health fall under their remit (coincidentally,
this particular issue became salient around the same time that the
Labour Government lost its parliamentary majority in 2010; hence
we have not sought to examine developments whilst Labour was in
office). During the subsequent period, when the issue of pesticides in
farming has been most salient, there have been five heads of that de-
partment, three of these, Caroline Spelman, Liz Truss and Andrea
Leadsom have not made their thoughts on the issue very public ex-
cept to be sceptical of any evidence of problems with neonicotinoids.
VC The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press.
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The other two incumbents, Owen Paterson and Michael Gove, how-
ever, have been very interventionist and vocal on public forums. It is
the stances of these latter two, therefore, that forms the majority of
our analysis of UK government stances.
Our methodology in carrying out this study is a qualitative one
and chosen because of the highly complex relationships between
government institutions, scientists, the political stances of some of
the main actors in the decision-making on the issue, and the various
institutions of the EU to which we have referred in some detail.
Evidence to support the theoretical framework and the case study it-
self has been gathered in a number of ways. These include an ana-
lysis of published scientific papers, books and articles on the PP,
relevant parliamentary select committee papers and speeches by pol-
iticians. The methods employed in this paper to retrieve information
include an analysis of published scientific papers, speeches by politi-
cians (specifically those of the two then Secretaries of State for the
Environment—Owen Paterson and Michael Gove), news reports
and the contribution of environmentalists to the debates on this
issue. In these investigations, we sought out both evidence that sup-
ports the case for the banning of neonicotinoids and also dissenting
opinions. We also looked at the political stances of the political
actors involved in the controversy by analysing their speeches. As
mentioned above, although there have been five Secretaries of State
for the Environment, we were unable to uncover any statements
made by Spelman, Truss, or Leadsom on the issue of bees and neoni-
cotinoids, and hence we have not discussed these individuals in this
article.
This article is organised in the following manner. It begins by
unpacking the precautionary principle/approach dichotomy, before
then outlining how the precautionary principle is used as a policy
tool. The article then examines the issue of bee health and scientific
research into the use of agricultural pesticides, before outlining how
industry has reacted to these scientific findings. The paper then
investigates policy options that were open to successive governments
and how they implemented decisions. The analysis concludes by
weighing whether the government took a sound science or precau-
tionary approach to the issue of pesticides and bee health. On the
issue outlined in this article, namely, the proposition that the bee
population is declining because of the use of certain pesticides, we
will see that the government actually adopted a precautionary ap-
proach, but only after a change of the Secretary of State. This con-
founds how the UK government has traditionally sought to make
environmental policy, which more often than not has been based on
the sound science approach.
The precautionary principle or a precautionary
approach?
There is considerable debate as to whether the terminology ‘precau-
tionary principle’ and ‘precautionary approach’ are equivalent or
used differently depending on the context (Cooney and Dickson
2005: 5). The fact that much of the literature agonises over the sig-
nificance, meaning and application of the precautionary principle,
indicates that it has one central difficulty—lack of clarity of mean-
ing. It is not surprising, therefore, that much of the literature on the
precautionary principle is critically against the whole concept (for
example, Bodansky 1991; Manson 2002 and Sunstein 2005).
One convenient way of coping with the problem of defining pre-
caution is to categorize it into ‘strong’ and ‘weak’ versions (Morris
2000; McLean and Patterson 2006; Patterson and McLean 2008).
In its strongest formulation, and preferred by ‘green’ NGOs, envi-
ronmentalists, and interest groups, the precautionary principle can
be said to insist upon absolute proof of safety before allowing new
technologies to be adopted. This formulation can be seen clearly in
the Wingspread declaration. A number of environmentalists from
the USA, Canada, and Europe, undertook the task of attempting to
outline ways in which the precautionary principle could be inte-
grated into decision-making. This group convened a Conference at
the Wingspread Conference Centre, Racine, in January 1998, which
resulted in the issuing of a consensus statement defining the precau-
tionary principle:
When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or the
environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if
some cause and effect relationships are not fully established sci-
entifically. In this context the proponent of an activity, rather
than the public, should bear the burden of proof (Raffensperger
and Tickner 1999: 8).
Here the onus is, for example, placed on the polluters to prove
beyond doubt that his/her polluting activities will not damage the
environment: that is, there has to be certainty that no harm will be-
fall the environment if no intervention is made. In considering this
strong formulation of the precautionary principle Sunstein argues it
‘is incoherent, and for one reason: There are risks on all sides of so-
cial situations. It is therefore paralyzing; It forbids the very steps
that it requires’ (Sunstein 2005: 4).
In contrast, a weaker version of the precautionary principle was
agreed in the Ministerial Declaration of the UN Conference on
Environment and Development (the ‘Earth Summit’) in Rio de
Janeiro—popularly known as the ‘Rio Declaration’. Principle 15
states: ‘Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage,
lack of scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postpon-
ing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation’
(United Nations 1992—emphasis added). This is a weaker version
than the Wingspread formulation because it has added the caveat
that any measures taken should be ‘cost-effective’ and is often seen
as a management approach to dealing with risk and uncertainty.
Here again, Sunstein is critical: ‘The weak versions of the precau-
tionary principle state a truism – uncontroversial in principle and ne-
cessary in practice only to combat public confusion . . .’ (Sunstein
2005: 24).
A more recent analysis of the precautionary principle addresses
this dilemma—that it is trivial or incoherent. Daniel Steel, a philoso-
pher, in his book (2014) dismisses these objections. He develops a
precautionary principle consisting of three components. First, is
what he terms the Meta-Precautionary Principle (MPP) which states
that in the face of serious environmental threats, uncertainty should
not be a reason for inaction (Steel 2014: 21). Secondly, the ‘Tripod’,
consisting of the knowledge condition, the harm condition and the
recommended precaution (Steel 2014: 9). Finally, proportionality—
tackles the criticism of the precautionary principle that it is incoher-
ent and therefore irrational. It is the idea that precaution should cor-
respond to how plausible and severe the threat. This works through
two sub-components: consistency and efficiency (Steel 2014: 27).
Proportionality is an important feature of the precautionary
principle and simply means that remedial measures should be tail-
ored to a chosen level of protection. This places the focus on the
magnitude of the effect. Rather than simply saying ‘there is uncer-
tainty therefore we should not proceed,’ policymakers and regula-
tors must weigh up the level of that uncertainty. In other words, the
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application of precaution ‘is context and case specific, that is it
depends on the level of risk a society considers acceptable for a spe-
cific substance or activity at a given moment in time’ (Christoforou
2003: 206). Similarly, the EU Commission has stated: ‘Proportional-
ity means tailoring measures to the chosen level of protection. Risk
can rarely be reduced to zero, but incomplete risk assessments may
greatly reduce the range of options open to risk managers. A total
ban may not be a proportional response to a potential risk in all
cases. However, in certain cases, it is the sole possible response to a
given risk’ (Commission of the EC 2000: 3).
In the EU there was much discussion in the 1990s on the precau-
tionary principle and how it should be applied (Douma 2003: 230).
In 2000, the EU Commission produced a Communication
(Commission of the EC 2000) that established guidelines for apply-
ing the principle to enable a common understanding of how to ap-
praise, manage, and communicate risk that science was unable to
definitively conclude. This Communication states that in specific cir-
cumstances where scientific evidence is insufficient, inconclusive, or
uncertain, and there are indications through preliminary objective
scientific evaluation of reasonable grounds for concern, then the pre-
cautionary principle is the correct risk strategy to use (Commission
of the EC 2000: 8–9). Its final purpose was to ensure that recourse
to the principle was not used as a form of protectionism.
However, one professor of risk management believes there is too
much focus on the precautionary principle. He notes that the EU has
been concerned that in an increasingly globalised world there was a
need to remain competitive to ensure sustained economic growth.
The EU Commission was also concerned about how to regain public
credibility after a number of regulatory scandals. In light of this,
according to Lofstedt, the drivers of European regulation were to be
competitiveness, sustainable development, and governance (Lofstedt
2004: 24). In his working paper for the AEI/Brookings Joint Centre
for Regulatory Studies, he noted that the two regulatory philoso-
phies the EU used are the precautionary principle and impact ana-
lysis, but that ‘. . .to date most of the academic attention has been
focused on the precautionary principle, but I think greater attention
needs now to be paid to impact analysis (Lofstedt 2004: 24).
In the USA, the George W. Bush Administration appeared to ob-
ject to the principle on the grounds that it interferes with the ability
of industry to make profits. The President’s Office of Management
and Budget argued that, ‘precaution is sensible but susceptible to
misuse’. If precaution is taken to an extreme, it can be very harmful
to technological innovation. (Graham 2002). A year later Graham
noted that the EU Communication was ‘following views that are
similar to the perspectives of the US government’ (Graham 2003: 4).
Other American analysts have asked the question who is more
precautionary: the USA or the EU? In their comprehensive book
comparing risk regulation in both the USA and the EU (Wiener et
al. 2011), their conclusions were that:
. . . the reality of precaution is particularity, not principle. The
real pattern of precaution across the Atlantic since the
1970. . .has been general parity, punctuated by occasional differ-
ences over particular risks, some of which become high-visibility
disputes (Wiener et al 2011: 555).
Two of the examples they mention are growth hormones in beef
such as bovine somatotropin (BST) and bovine spongiform enceph-
alopathy (BSE). These examples show that while the EU was more
precautionary about beef hormones than the USA, the USA was
more precautionary than the EU on BSE: the USA was much quicker
than the EU in banning the export of British beef (Wiener et al.
2011: 65). Historically, this is what Wiener et al. call the ‘flip-flop’
hypothesis, with the USA more precautionary than Europe in the
1970s, while the EU became more precautionary in the 1990s
(Wiener et al. 2011: 5). However, Vogel, in an article on European
environmental regulation believes that EU regulatory policies since
the 1990s resemble the policies of the USA in the 1970s. His conclu-
sions were that:
. . . in many respects European and American regulatory politics
have ‘traded places’. Regulatory issues were formerly more polit-
ically salient and civic interests more influential in the United
States than in most individual European countries or the EU.
More recently, this pattern has been reversed (Vogel 2003: 558).
The precautionary principle as a policy tool
Using the precautionary principle in the presence of uncertainty can
be explained by reference to public policy decisions. Policy fields
may show characteristics that are either routine, complex, or tech-
nically difficult. In these categories, strategies for coping can be
made as outcomes are certain. There are some fields, however,
where there are scientific unknowns with no determined solutions,
or indeed there are rival claims from experts. As a result, there is sci-
entific uncertainty which goes beyond the range of known, observ-
able uncertainties that are recognised within the parameters of the
system being researched. As Wynne puts it: ‘scientific knowledge
gives prominence to a restricted agenda of defined uncertainties –
ones that are tractable – leaving invisible a range of other uncertain-
ties, especially about the boundary conditions of applicability of the
existing framework of knowledge to new situations’ (Wynne 1992:
115). In this seminal work, Wynne introduced a typology to identify
four different kinds of uncertainty: risk, uncertainty, ignorance, and
indeterminacy. Risk is considered to occur when we ‘know the
odds’—that is, when we know the boundaries of the system under
investigation and are able to measure in some way the factors
involved. Uncertainty represents knowledge of the parameters of a
system—‘limitations of observational and measurement techniques’
(Salter 1988: 201). Ignorance is that which is not known: for ignor-
ance to be identified, new knowledge must be discoverable. The last
category, indeterminacy, is the ‘recognition of the open-ended and
conditional nature of knowledge and its embeddedness in social con-
texts’ (Hunt 1994: 117). This fourth category recognizes that social
behaviour has to be included into the policy process, and generally
fits the categories of the precautionary principle and the precaution-
ary approach outlined in our introduction. This typology highlights
the point that the conventional debate on risk implies that risk is al-
ways quantifiable, but in doing so, it reduces scientific uncertainties
to the notion that what is studied by experts is controlled and all
ambiguities are solvable. It is also worth noting that in applying the
precautionary approach to particular situations, there is an import-
ant distinction between prevention and precaution. The precaution-
ary approach is applied when there is uncertainty as to the effects of
a disease, substance, or industrial process. Where it is known that,
for example, a substance resulting from industrial emissions will
cause harm, the principle is one of prevention (Haigh 1994: 241).
In the European Environmental Agency study on the precaution-
ary principle, the authors conducted 14 case studies of environmen-
tal disaster that had occurred around the world and found, among
their other conclusions that ‘If more account, scientifically, political-
ly and economically, is taken of a richer body of information from
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more diverse sources, then society may do substantially better in the
future at achieving a better balance between innovations and their
hazards’ (Harremoes et al. 2002: 216).
Several decades ago, two analysts argued that an appeal to ob-
jective facts can increase, rather than close off, political debate.
Science will always encounter either an ‘under-critical’ or an ‘over-
critical’ environment when it is linked to policy. In the under-critical
model, a policy consensus exists before new research is undertaken,
and so ensures a too easy reception of scientific claims that appear
to support the policy. In the over-critical model, political adversaries
are sharply divided, and scientific claims are subjected to close scru-
tiny by experts from rival groups, ‘technical debate therefore
becomes endless. . . in either case the impact of science on policy is
negligible’ (Collingridge and Reeve 1986: 31).
Two recent medical science issues illustrate this point. First, the
issue of sugar in diets. For at least three decades, fat was seen as the
problem in most diets—the under-critical model. However, more re-
cently, sugar has arisen to the fore with some medical researchers
sounding the alarm that sugar, not fat, was the greatest danger to
human health. This created a long debate amongst the nutritional
scientists as to whether sugar or fat was the cause of obesity. One
nutritionalist, Nina Teicholz, wrote an article in the BMJ criticising
the established dietary guidelines which resulted in 173 scientists
signing a letter to the BMJ demanding it retract the article (Leslie
2016). The second example of scientific disagreement is the issue of
parents being convicted of shaking their baby, causing death. Many
scientists believed in the hypothesis that shaking a baby was the only
cause of bleeding in the brain and retina, combined with brain swel-
ling, again, the under-critical model. Meanwhile, other scientists
who had been expert witnesses in court cases did not believe this
was necessarily the case. Some of these scientists were vilified by
their colleagues, and one expert witness was struck off for her views
(Storr 2017).
Therefore, these, and many other recent issues which have posed
potential threats to the environment or human health have become
the subject of controversy, not necessarily because of any novelty
factor, but because of competing views over proposed solutions, or
even as to whether a problem exists. Many of these issues reveal a
split between those actors who take a sound science approach, rely-
ing on firm evidence of risk, and those who would take a precau-
tionary approach when there appears to be significant risk. The
former approach can be discerned in the UK policy style in the cases
of BSE in cattle, in the development of genetically modified organ-
isms (GMOs) and in the use of organophosphates (OPs) in sheep
farming (Patterson 2008). The UK government’s instinctive response
at the time was to invoke the ‘sound science’ principle. In other
words, action had to be based on concrete evidence that a causal re-
lationship had been established between the alleged threat and
human health before remedial measures were taken, and further-
more, in the above cases it was claimed that there was no evidence
to support such remedial action’ (Patterson and McLean 2017: 3).
This demonstrates a culture of deference, where the public must rely
on the ‘expert’ to decide, using risk assessment techniques; where
events are manipulated; where demands are made for verifiable evi-
dence of proof of damage; and where the government’s own experts
are chosen selectively, while at the same time efforts are made to dis-
credit ‘outside’ expert opinion. It is also a culture of avoidance; evi-
dence that is controversial is presented to the public in ways that
play down its importance. Despite all of this, the UK government
has committed itself to the precautionary principle: the govern-
ment’s inter-departmental Liaison Group on risk assessment paper
(ILGRA) was first published in 2002 and is still extant (ILGRA
2002). This document clearly states: ‘The government is committed
to using the precautionary principle which is included in the
1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’ (ILGRA
2002: 2).
The issue of bee health
Pesticides are an important tool in intensive agriculture and food
production. There has to be, however, a trade-off between the
effects of these pesticides on nature and the protection of the envir-
onment, and therein lies the problem. Over the past several decades,
for example, scientists have noted a global decline in bee popula-
tions. Climate change, viruses, fungi, the varroa mite and other par-
asites, and the destruction of habitats have all been put forward as
explanations for this decline. More recently, the widespread use of
neonicotinoid pesticide seed dressings has come under close scrutiny
as the likely cause of this decline. Neonicotinoids, first used in the
1990s, are systematic neurotoxins that affect ‘the central nervous
system in insects, causing nervous stimulation at low concentrations,
but receptor blockage, paralysis and death at higher concentrations’,
and they ‘act systematically, travelling through plant tissue and pro-
tecting all parts of the crop, and are widely applied to seed dressings’
(Goulson, 2013: 977). These pesticides find their way through the
plant’s system. Worryingly, according to the UK’s Chief Scientific
Advisor, neonicotinoids ‘. . .were being used widely throughout the
arable cereal industry and in some specialised crops such as carrots,
parsnips and sugar beet, not just on flowering crops’ (Boyd 2018:
921).
The EU proposed to ban three of the most used neonicotinoids in
2013, but the then UK Secretary for the Environmental did not sup-
port the measures proposed because he wanted ‘scientific proof
based on “real world, not theoretical” studies that pesticide poison-
ing is to blame’ (McCarthy 2013). Rather predictably, the pesticide
industry was vigorous in its denial that there is a problem with its
products. However, by November 2017, the present Secretary of
State for the Environment, Michael Gove had become worried about
the fall in the numbers of flying insect populations, ‘because of the
critical role played by bees and other pollinators. These particular
flying insects are absolutely critical to the health of the natural
world’ (Gove 2017). He went on to observe that such deterioration
in the environment is also bad economic news, as pollinators ‘con-
tribute somewhere between £400-600 m every year to agricultural
productivity. . .’ (Gove 2017). He proposed supporting restrictions
on neonicotinoids.
The chief scientific advisor at the Department for Environment,
Food and Rural Affairs Professor Ian Boyd, said at the time: ‘The
important question is whether neonicotinoids’ use results in harmful
effects on populations of bees and other pollinators as a whole. The
available evidence [now] justifies taking further steps to restrict the
use of neonicotinoids’ (Carrington 2017).
Scientific research into the issue of agricultural
pesticides
Behind the calls for more research and bans on the use of these pesti-
cides are a number of scientific studies that show that when insects
are fed on neonicotinoid insecticides some negative effects on their
behaviour and life cycles will be found. A number of high profile sci-
entific studies have shown neonicotinoids to increase mortality in









bria user on 27 Septem
ber 2019
honeybees (Biesmeijer et al. 2006; van der Sluijs et al. 2013;
Woodcock et al. 2017) and reduce the reproductive success of bum-
blebees (Whitehorn et al. 2012). A Royal Society paper summarised
much of the research:
Evidence continues to accumulate from semi-field experiments
that sublethal exposure to neonicotinoid insecticides, chiefly but
not exclusively at the high end of what is likely to be experienced
in the environment can affect foraging and other behaviours in
the field. Several true field studies have reported no effect of ex-
posure to neonicotinoid-treated crops on honeybee colony per-
formance, but the first large-scale study of the exposure of bum-
blebees found strong evidence of harmful effects’ (Godfray et al.
2015: A27).
And so the debate on neonicotinoid insecticides has found that:
‘. . . major gaps in our understanding remain, and different policy
conclusions can be drawn depending on the weight one accords to
important (but not definitive) science findings and the weightings
given to the economic and other interests of different stakeholders’
(Godfray et al. 2015: para 4). In 2009, the EU issued a Guidance
Document on the risk assessment of plant products and bees
(Regulation (EC) 1107/2009). The EU had in the past approved five
neonicotinoid insecticides for plant protection; clothianidin, imida-
cloprid, thiamethoxam acetamiprid, and thiacloprid. A new scientif-
ic review of these neonicotinoids was published in the European
Food Safety Authority (EFSA) Journal in 2013 (EFSA 2013). This re-
view studied 30 scientific papers submitted to the EU Commission
by the agrochemical industry when seeking approval and registra-
tion of the three of these products. The conclusions of this review
were that these three insecticides, clothianidin, imidacloprid, and
thiamethoxam, were a: ‘significant risk to honey bees when used on
flowering crops. In addition, risks were identified through their use
on winter cereals, and other crops that are not attractive to bees, es-
pecially through exposure to insecticide-laden dust dispersed into
the atmosphere at sowing’ (McGrath 2014: 3). In the light of these
conclusions, in March 2013 the EU Commission banned the use of
these three products for two years: (EU Commission 2013). Under
this ban, farmers were not able to buy or sow seeds of crops treated
with the three insecticides in question that were attracted for bees.
This decision was due to be reviewed by November 2017.
An article co-authored by the UK’s Chief Scientific Adviser noted
the unsatisfactory way in which pesticides are regulated in the EU.
The article, in Science, suggested that a new system:
. . . would place responsibility for monitoring the use and effects
of these chemicals on manufacturers and growers by applying
preregistered designs for how data should be collected. It would
improve decisions concerning approved use and would avoid sole
reliance on ad hoc studies and sparse data (Milner and Boyd
2017: 4).
They named their idea pesticidovigilance as an equivalent to
pharmacovigilance, an existing system through which pharmaceuti-
cals undergo data collection and monitoring. Moreover, a professor
of law and risk regulation, Alberto Alemanno, in an article pub-
lished in the European Journal of Risk, sees the decision of the EU
to ban neonicotinoid pesticides, while not expressly relying on the
precautionary principle, as clearly based on the principle but has
problems with the legality of the decision. This, he notes is because
of the different member state approaches and farming practices
which have made the task of the EU difficult (Alemanno 2013: 202).
He sees the neonicotinoid issue as a new test case for the precaution-
ary principle.
In addition to the debates between scientists on neonicotinoids
there was conflicting opinions in the news media, typified by the
writings of George Monbiot, an environmental journalist and Matt
Ridley who writes on many subjects. Monbiot, a supporter of the
precautionary principle, writing in the Guardian, supports the EU’s
review of the impacts of neonicotinoids (Monbiot 2014). Ridley, not
a supporter of the precautionary principle, and having a eurosceptic
tendency, stated in a Times article that banning neonicotinoids
would prove counter-productive for bees and the EU’s addiction to
the precautionary principle. . . has caused many perverse policy deci-
sions’ (Ridley 2014).
Industry response
The neonicotinoid pesticides that are widely used in Europe and the
UK are manufactured by Bayer AG in Germany, and Syngenta, man-
ufactured in the UK. Both companies, not surprisingly, denied that
their products are the cause of problems with bees and both compa-
nies were present at the hearings in the European General Court
where the Commission-proposed ban was debated. At the hearing, a
lawyer representing Bayer, Kristina Nordlander, claimed that ‘there
is no evidence despite over 20 years of intense study that neonicoti-
noids have any link to colony honeybee losses’ (Bodoni 2017).
There has been criticism from Bayer and Syngenta of many of
the scientific studies because they were carried out in laboratory
conditions where bees were fed on pesticide-treated food, whereas,
in the wild bees are free to choose where they forage. But the agro-
chemical industry’s own research appears to be also flawed, as will
be shown below. Also, and damaging to the industry case, there has
been some research that indicates that there are no yield benefits
from insecticidal seed treatments (Seagraves and Lundgren 2011;
Lechenet et al. 2017), which negates the industry and farmers’
objections that the ban on the products will damage their industry.
There are several industry studies into the problem, but many of
them remain unpublished, and it is said by some that this is because
the results do not completely back up industry claims that their
products are safe (Greenpeace 2016). For example, in 2014, Bayer
and Syngenta asked the UK Centre for Ecology and Hydrology
(CEH), a UK government funded research organisation to conduct
an independent field trial of two neonicotinoids (clothianidin, man-
ufactured by Bayer and thiamethoxam, manufactured by Syngenta),
in three countries: Germany, Hungary, and the UK. This research
was eventually published in the journal Science (Woodcock et al.
2017). The results were mixed. Exposure to treated crops reduced
the overwintering success of honey bee colonies in two of the three
countries. This meant that the neonicotinoids investigated caused a
reduced capacity for all three bee species to establish new popula-
tions in the following year, at least in the UK and Hungary. The re-
search conclusions were: ‘Taken together, our results suggest that
exposure to neonicotinoid seed treatments can have negative effects
on the interannual reproductive potential of both wild and managed
bees, but these effects are not consistent across countries’
(Woodcock et al. 2017: 2)
One journalist quoted Dave Goulson, a professor at the
University of Sussex, as saying: ‘Given all the debate about this sub-
ject, it is hard to see why the companies don’t make these kinds of
studies available. It does seem a little shady to do this kind of field
study – the very studies the companies say are the most important
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ones – and then not tell people what they find’ (Carrington 2016).
Moreover, parliament’s audit select committee recently reported
that much of bee research is tainted by corporate funding. The chair
of the committee has declared, ‘When it comes to research on pesti-
cides, the Department of Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA) is content to let manufacturers fund the work’, and further
stated that, ‘This testifies to a loss of environmental protection cap-
acity in the department responsible for it. If the research is to com-
mand public confidence, independent controls need to be
maintained at every step’ (Carrington 2014).
A further stakeholder, the National Farmers Union (NFU), is
firmly against the ban on neonicotinoids given the possible econom-
ic impact it might make. The NFU told the government that, for ex-
ample, it was becoming impossible to grow oilseed rape without the
use of these pesticides (AgroPages 2017). According to one environ-
mental scientist, many of the reports about the effects of the ban on
farming are exaggerated. She cites the report from the UK farming
press that without the pesticides ‘UK wheat yields could decline by
up to 20%. This is a disingenuous interpretation of an industry-
funded report, and the EU is not proposing to ban neonicotinoid use
in wheat anyway, because wheat is not a crop attractive to bees’
(Dicks 2013). These exaggerations were not restricted to industry
interests according to Dicks: ‘The Guardian, a pro-environment
British newspaper, mangled my parliamentary evidence on moths
and beetles to claim that three-quarters of all UK pollinator species,
including bees, were in severe decline’ (Dicks 2013).
Policy options and government decisions
When the EU first proposed a ban on neonicotinoids the UK govern-
ment did not support the proposal. It claimed that it wished to see
the results of its own trials of the effects of the pesticides before tak-
ing any decision. When DEFRA, received the results, it decided,
based on three published studies (Gill et al. 2012; Henry et al.
2012; Whitehorn et al. 2012) that:
While this assessment cannot exclude rare effects of neonicoti-
noids on bees in the field, it suggests that effects on bees do not
occur under normal circumstances. This assessment also suggests
that laboratory-based studies demonstrating sub-lethal effects on
bees from neonicotinoids did not replicate realistic conditions,
but extreme scenarios. Consequently, it supports the view that
the risk to bee populations from neonicotinoids, as they are cur-
rently used, is low (Defra 2013).
Following this conclusion, the Secretary of State at DEFRA, Owen
Paterson, one of the UK’s most prominent Eurosceptic politicians cam-
paigned against the EU ban. In a speech to the National Farmers
Union he criticised the Commission: ‘I have asked the Commission to
consider all the evidence and to wait for the results of our field trials,
rather than rushing to a decision based on lab tests alone’ (Paterson
2013a). Yet, the process in Europe was one where the ban on the three
neonicotinoids was imposed after a scientific review, and a series of
two votes. The first vote, on 15 March 2013, followed a meeting of
the Standing Committee on the Food Chain and Animal Health and
resulted in a stalemate. The UK abstained. On 29 April 2013, the se-
cond vote was held, and 15 countries voted for the ban, eight against,
including the UK and four countries abstained.
Furthermore, Paterson sent a letter to Sygenta supporting their
objection to the EU ban. He wrote: ‘There is good evidence that
effects of concern can be triggered in bees by sub-lethal doses of
neonicotinoids. However, the field evidence suggests that this will
not be a normal occurrence’ (Paterson 2013b). Paterson also
claimed that: ‘. . .the honey bee population has not been in decline’,
‘. . .honeybee numbers are higher than they were two decades ago
when neonics were first introduced’ (Andrews 2017). He did not
offer any evidence to back up this statement. Yet, as we have seen
above, all of the scientific papers we have cited believe that all pol-
linator populations have declined worldwide, while acknowledging
there is no single cause. From the UK point of view, here we can see
that DEFRA, or at least its then Secretary of State, were in a sound
science frame of mind: waiting until the evidence becomes conclu-
sive that a problem exists before undertaking governmental
intervention.
Michael Gove is similarly Eurosceptic, and was a leading pro-
ponent of the Vote Leave campaign during the Brexit referendum.
On becoming Secretary of State for the Environment, however, he
was more guarded on scientific evidence regarding the issue of neon-
icotinoids, and on a number of other environmental issues.
Specifically, on the question on the precautionary principle he
appears to have an open mind. In answer to a question from
Parliament’s Environmental Audit Committee as to whether the
government would drop the principle he said:
No. The striking thing if one talks to environmental lawyers is
they make the point that these are interpretive principles. They
are there to govern how policy is designed and devised. I do not
think the right answer, and I know lots of environmental lawyers
take this view, is to place these principles on a statutory basis
(Environmental Audit Committee 2017; Q15).
On neonicotinoids he announced on the UK government’s own
website that: ‘I have set out our vision for a Green Brexit in which
environmental standards are not only maintained but enhanced. I’ve
always been clear I will be led by the science on this matter’ (Gov.uk
2017). Gove made clear in an article in The Guardian that a deterio-
rating environment is bad for the economy while understanding the
importance of neonicotinoids to farmers but that ‘. . .ultimately we
must ensure that we think about the long-term health of our envir-
onment, because unless we take steps now to arrest environmental
damage we will all be the losers’ (Gove 2017).
Discussion
The concern amongst the scientific and environmental communities
over a number of neonicotinoid insecticides inevitably found its way
into the policy arena. Moreover, there have been over 30 separate
scientific studies in the last 3 years that have shown adverse effects
on bees and other insects resulting from neonicotinoids. The prob-
lem is that all pesticides are by their very nature toxic to insects and
getting this balance between the different stakeholders is difficult for
policymakers. In the case of neonicotinoid insecticides, there
appears to be evidence to support both those who would ban these
insecticides and the agrochemical and farming interests: some field
studies have found no effects of exposure to neonicotinoid treated
crops, while other high-grade studies have found evidence of harm
to bees.
On the one hand, many EU member states appear to have sup-
ported the case put forward by the agrochemical industry rather
than be persuaded by the scientific advice. On the other hand, envir-
onmental interests may have exaggerated the risks posed by neoni-
cotinoids. And it is interesting the way that industry picked fault
with some scientific papers and not others and generally tried to dis-
tort the evidence it did not like (and hid evidence not convenient to
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its case) as noted by the parliamentary audit committee (House of
Commons 2013). Also, over the course of these events there appears
to have been much exaggeration and misinformation by the agro-
chemical industry and farming interests. And it seems, at one time,
the UK government was very partial to the agrochemical interests to
the extent that the UK Environment Secretary had sent a letter of
support to Syngenta’s case that neonicotinoids were not harmful to
bees. Moreover, what did not seem to get much publicity was the
admittedly limited evidence that shows using neonicotinoid insecti-
cides does not greatly increase crop yields.
In the UK, there has clearly been a move from a position of the gov-
ernment waiting for absolute conclusive evidence that neonicotinoid
insecticides were harming bees before taking any action at all, moving
to a position of applying responsible management practices based on the
best available scientific evidence—in other words being proactive rather
than reactive. The government’s position went from one secretary of
state stubbornly refusing to do anything about the warnings (Owen
Paterson), to a successor secretary of state accepting that a lack of full
scientific certainty was not a justification for postponing action to pre-
vent what may turn out to be serious harm to the environment (Michael
Gove). The move from a sound science approach to a precautionary one
seems to have been based more on the personalities of the Secretaries of
State than a paradigm shift in government thinking, however, despite
the government being notionally committed to deploying the
Precautionary Principle as outlined in the ILGRA (2002) report. Owen
Patterson is an MP whose policymaking seems to fit the sound science
mindset. He has a record as a secretary of state of making decisions
based on ‘no scientific evidence’ being found, as in the irrational policy
shift on the case of the government’s attempts to control bovine tubercu-
losis by culling badgers (Flynn 2017). Similarly, he promoted the exten-
sion of GM crops, claiming that ‘greater regulatory scrutiny probably
makes GMOs even safer than conventional plants and food’ (UK
Government 2015). He went on to state: ‘We need evidence-based regu-
lation and decision making in the EU’ (UK Government 2015). This is
remarkably complaisant attitude given the number of studies that show
that insects could rapidly evolve resistance to genetically engineered
crops, what one scientist described as ‘the natural evolutionary “arms
race” between insects and plants’ (Nottingham 2003: 55). Moreover, a
major concern remains that GM herbicide-tolerant crops may become
invasive, and that genes may be transferred to wild relatives and the
ensuing offspring will in some way be detrimental to existing flora and
fauna (Patterson 2008: 141–2). The whole tone of his thinking is that,
as noted in the introduction, we wait until the evidence becomes conclu-
sive that a problem does exist before government intervenes.
Michael Gove, however, is perhaps is more circumspect towards
relying on science alone to determine environmental policymaking. As
one political commentator has noted, he has recently, ‘chameleon-
like. . . recycled himself as an eco-warrior’, and ‘convinced green cam-
paigners that he is one of their own’ (Grice 2018). Since becoming en-
vironmental secretary, he has banned the sale of ivory products, the
manufacture of plastic microbeads and has planned to reintroduce bea-
vers into the countryside. So, it is possible that while the decision on
neonicotinoids appears to be consistent with a government’s commit-
ment to the precautionary principle, this adherence is more likely to be
based on the particular world-view of a politician as opposed to a con-
sistent government stance on the Precautionary Principle.
Conclusions
Our examination of this issue shows that the UK government’s con-
sideration of the EU proposed ban on neonicotinoid insecticides,
probably swayed by the agrochemical industry’s stance, had initially
followed a sound science approach in that it preferred to wait until
there was conclusive evidence that there was a problem.
Furthermore, it is clear that the government supported the agrichem-
ical industry in their denials that there may be a problem with neoni-
cotinoid products. The government initially played down the
potential risk until the sheer pressure of new scientific evidence
made it difficult for the government to maintain its position. When
this occurred, it became increasingly expedient to take action in ad-
vance of conclusive evidence that pesticides might be harming bee
health, therefore warranting intervention. At that point, the secre-
tary of state for the environment made a decision to support the
restrictions.
In this case study, we can see the fourth factor in Wynne’s risk
typology: indeterminacy; that is the open-ended and conditional na-
ture of knowledge—the very large number of scientific studies into
neonicotinoid herbicides with no consensus on whether or not there
is conclusive evidence of harm and also the opinions of the various
stakeholders. This is an example of the selective use of the precau-
tionary principle. Selective because of the part played by a particular
decision-maker, Michael Gove. But it was clearly the use of the
weaker version of the precautionary principle because, in the words
of the Rio definition of the PP (UN 1992): ‘lack of scientific cer-
tainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective
measures to prevent environmental degradation’.
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